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 SMALL FORCES AND LARGE FIRMS: FOUNDATIONS OF THE RBV 
Abstract 
The article presents a synthesis of several papers I have written, mostly in the economics 
literature, since the publication of “A Resource-based View of the Firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984). The 
starting point is a very small force: The reduction in bargaining costs when several bargains are 
pooled into one. I show how one can construct a theory of the firm based on this force and 
defend the theory by arguing that it makes predictions consistent with several stylized facts. In 
addition, the theory suggests that firms should decide on their strategy and scope based on excess 
capacity of productive resources – exactly like the RBV. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper is about firms. Most readers of this journal are teaching about firms, managing 
firms, or advising clients who run firms. And yet, scandalously, we have no generally accepted 
answers to the most basic questions about them. What is a firm? When should we use them? 
How do they work differently than markets? Why do some of them diversify? The following 
proposes a unified theory that speaks to these questions and at the same time can serve as a 
micro-foundation for the Resource-Based View of the Firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). The literature 
contains many deep and well-travelled lines of reasoning about these matters and I do not expect 
to fully convince the reader. However, given the importance of the issues, I will be happy just to 
stimulate more discussion of, and work on, foundational issues in strategic management. 
 
The argument starts with a discussion of a “small” force; the difference in bargaining 
costs between negotiating a single average price for a lot of services versus negotiating separate 
prices for each individual service. To think of bargaining costs as being subject to economies of 
scale in this sense is not counterintuitive: When faced with the task of trading thirty small items, 
most people would prefer to negotiate once over the bundle rather thirty times on an item-by-
item basis. I will show how economies of scale in bargaining costs can help us explain why we 
have firms. The theory is consistent with many stylized facts about firms: They are used when 
more frequent and diverse adaptations are needed, when the benefits of specialization are 
smaller, and when it is costly to switch suppliers. Based on this concept of the firm, we can 
immediately derive several differences between firms and markets: Who should own the 
productive assets?, How does the steepness of incentives compare?, How do the patterns of 
communication differ?, and who should make which decisions? We then look at the role of 
human assets in the growth and heterogeneity of firms and in the process re-discover one of the 
central tenets of the RBV, the idea that strategy and scope are based on leveraging excess 
capacity of resources. 
In contrast to the complex interactive effects favored by much recent theoretical literature 
on the firm, many of the arguments offered here rely on comparatively simpler and more direct 
forces. This simplicity often has the effect of turning received wisdom on its head. Instead of “I 
am the boss because I own the assets” (Grossman and Hart, 1986), it is “I own the assets because 
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I am the boss”. Employment contracts are low-powered, not because employees are supposed to, 
by themselves, allocate some time to aspects of the job that are not contractible (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991), but because the boss might intervene and order them to do something not 
covered by the incentives. There is less communication between than within firms, not because 
firms can commit to treat bad news gently, but to protect the firm’s bargaining power. Decision 
rights are not yielded to enhance investment incentives (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), but because it 
is too costly to agree on everything. Rather than, “since contracts are incomplete, they can be 
renegotiated” (Hart and Moore, 1990), it is “contracts can be left incomplete, because they can 
be renegotiated”. 
 
2. SUB-ADDITIVE BARGAINING COSTS  
Using language from physics, economists often refer to bargaining costs as “frictions” in 
the workings of the economy (Williamson, 1981). The analogy to air-resistance etc. suggests two 
implications: That friction safely can be ignored for many purposes (apples dropping), and that it 
is critical in others (flight).  Economists have largely embraced the first implication, but not the 
second. Bargaining costs are almost universally abstracted from. In particular, perfect and 
costless “Coasian bargaining”, though originally introduced as part of a reductio ad absurdum 
(Coase, 1960), is now a standard assumption (Hart, 2008).  
The demonstrated success of frictionless models is certainly part of the reason for this, 
but the amorphous nature of bargaining costs is another. While it often does not matter exactly 
why bargaining is costly, the costs themselves come in many guises. The most immediate 
examples are that bargaining is unpleasant, takes time, and is subject to strategic inefficiencies 
(Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). But in many cases more substantial costs may be incurred in 
the form of investments in bargaining power (Tullock, 1980), time spent preparing to bargain 
(Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006), and post-bargaining aggrievement  (Hart and 
Moore, 2008). Sources of bargaining costs differ from situation to situation and no single source 
is universally important. Furthermore, apart from the quite unsatisfactory “fixed cost of 
bargaining”, there is no unified way to model all of these types of costs. So it is perhaps not 
surprising that bargaining costs have a bad name in economics. 
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Conceding that bargaining costs generally are “small”, they are most likely to matter 
where a lot of bargains have to be struck in a short amount of time. Intuitively, it would seem to 
be “expensive” if executives and production foremen have to bargain with their subordinates at 
each turn. Consistent with this, the analysis tells us that bargaining costs matter most in 
situations in which pairs of agents have frequent needs for mutual adaptation. (If many agents are 
involved, it can reasonably be argued that market discipline eliminates the scope for, and thus 
any cost of, bargaining.) 
Considering the obvious absurdity of bosses negotiating payments for every order given, 
it is logical to ask whether bargaining costs are sub-additive, such that the parties can economize 
on bargaining costs by pooling several bargains into one. Maciejovsky and Wernerfelt (2011) 
experimentally address the dual issues of existence and sub-additivity of bargaining costs. 
Subjects are given the role of buyer or seller, paired up, and asked to bargain several times. In 
each bargain, the sellers’ costs and buyers’ values are random draws from commonly known 
distributions. The draws are common knowledge and at the end of the experiment subjects are 
paid, for all consummated trades, the difference between negotiated prices and own costs/values. 
The novel aspect of the experiment is that subjects, at any time, can make two kinds of offers; 
one applying to the current trade only, and one applying to all current and future trades. So the 
latter effectively pools the remaining bargains into one. Pooling is generally not costless because 
the rules specify that all bargains covered by a pooling agreement have to be consummated. As 
the supports of costs and values are partially overlapping, costs may exceed values in some 
bargains. These can be avoided if the subjects bargain on a trade by trade basis, but not if they 
pool. The article reports on six variations of the experiment. The results, and their consistent 
pattern across treatments, show that bargaining costs exist, matter, and are sub-additive in the 
experimental setting. 
The experiment does not admit several frequently mentioned sources of bargaining costs. 
Subjects cannot expend any resources preparing to bargain, they have no opportunity to burn 
surplus with inefficient post-bargaining behavior, and there should be no distortions from 
incomplete information (all the treatments involve full information bargaining). This does not 
imply that the above types of bargaining costs do not exist; I believe that they do, but it suggests 
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that simply “not liking to spend ones time bargaining” is sufficiently important to show up in the 
data. 
  
3. THEORY OF THE FIRM 
 
Before describing the proposed theory, I would like to make some more general 
observations about its relationship to transaction-cost economics (TCE) and the property rights 
theory (PRT).   
First, since firms are “common”, in the sense that there are many of them, their existence 
should ideally be explained by some equally common factors. In particular, even though “hold-
up” is an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon in both PRT and TCE, one wonders how widespread it 
is, and thus whether the threat of it can explain the multitude of firms in the economy. 
Bargaining frictions, in contrast, are ubiquitous. 
Second, since we can imagine a wide variety of institutions, it would seem unlikely that 
two or more problems would have the same solutions, as when TCE portrays the firm as a 
response to any mixture of ex ante and ex post inefficiencies. In contrast, PRT focuses entirely 
on ex ante inefficiencies and I look at ex post inefficiencies. 
Third, when thinking of the firm, it is possible to define its essence in terms of joint asset 
ownership or the employment relationship. TCE suggests that the two are driven by 
“substantially the same forces” (Williamson, 1975, p. 99) and PRT gives primacy to asset 
ownership with employment following by definition (Grossman and Hart, 1986). I will use 
employment relationship as the basis for the theory of the firm and show in a later Section that 
asset ownership is likely to co-vary. 
Fourth, legal and governmental definitions of employment do not provide precise 
standards by which to judge a theory. These definitions are vague and imprecise – probably 
reflecting the lack of theoretical clarity in the area. A complementary, and possibly better, 
standard is given by “everyday language” use the terms “firm” and “employee”. In the end, we 
probably cannot develop a theory that exactly rationalizes one of these standards. However, 
some theories will clearly come closer than others. 
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The primary source of inspiration for my theory of the firm is the literature on optimal 
trading mechanisms following Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); combined with the powerful 
intuition that it would be massively inefficient for bosses to negotiate a new fee each time they 
issue a different instruction. To make this hold up to theoretical scrutiny, I need the positive and 
sub-additive bargaining costs discussed in Section 2.  
The theory is developed in Wernerfelt (1997, 2012a). Both papers are focused sellers 
supplying services to buyers with changing needs. Consider first three bilateral mechanisms (as 
in Wernerfelt, 1997): Employment, Sequential Contracting, and Price Lists.1  
In the Employment mechanism, the parties negotiate, on a once-and-for-all basis, a wage 
and a large set of services to be supplied on demand. Examples of services covered could be all 
the many things a secretary or a superintendent may be asked to do. Since a lot is covered by the 
agreement, the initial bargaining costs may be large, but in equilibrium, no further costs are 
incurred, while gains from trade are realized in every period. If one of the parties initiates a later 
re-negotiation of the wage, bargaining costs are incurred again and there is a corresponding loss 
of efficiency.  
Under Sequential Contracting, a new price is negotiated whenever the buyer’s needs 
change, and bargaining costs are incurred on each occasion. However, these bargains are simpler 
than those required for employment contracts; only a single, known service is involved and the 
overall stakes are lower. The per-occasion bargaining costs are thus lower. 
With Price Lists, a set of prices are agreed upon ex ante and then referred to as needed. 
As in Sequential Contracting, the per-service bargaining costs are again fairly low. However, the 
mechanism is not efficient if the parties have to negotiate a very, very long price list. So the 
diversity of needs (how long a price list would have to be) plays an important role in the relative 
attractiveness of alternative mechanisms. 
 With sufficiently frequent needs for adaptation, the folk theorem allows us to assume 
that all trade is efficient in Employment and under Sequential Contracting, while the Price List is 
assumed to implement all efficient trades covered by the list.2 This means that the only 
                                                          
1 These are named “Hierarchy”, “Negotiation-as-needed”, and “Price Lists”, respectively, in Wernerfelt (1997). That 
paper also uses “communication costs” as the leading example of bargaining costs. 
2The original version of this paper contained an explicit dynamic model with two-sided incomplete information 
along with a folk-theorem proving the limiting efficiency of ex post trade. Most of this formality was taken out of 
the reduced form version eventually published. 
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bargaining costs are those associated with the process itself – there are no trading inefficiencies. 
Given this, the performances of the three mechanisms only differ because of the different costs 
of adjusting to changes. In the Employment mechanism, these are the one-time costs of 
negotiating a wage-agreement, with Sequential Contracting, these are the per-change costs of 
agreeing on new prices, and in the Price List, and these are the one-time costs of negotiating the 
price list plus the loss of gains from trades not covered by the list. Since no mechanism can 
govern change with lower variable costs of adaptation than Employment (just a verbal 
instruction), there exists a region of the parameter space (with needs for frequent adaptation) in 
which it weakly dominates all other mechanisms in a very large space. In Figure 1 below, I have 
plotted the most efficient mechanisms in terms of the relative importance of frequent and diverse 
adaptation. Looking at the Figure, Price Lists are good when they can be kept relatively short, 
Sequential Contracting is good when change is infrequent, and Employment is good when 
frequent and diverse adaptations are needed. 
 
Figure 1 
Most Efficient Mechanisms 1   
 
Importance of 
diverse adaptation 
 
    Sequential Contracting                      Employment 
 
 
 
                                                Price List 
     
Importance of frequent adaptation 
 
In order to bring large markets into the comparison, I add a second friction (bargaining 
costs being the first) and assume that a seller has to invest in a specific set-up cost to cover the 
costs of transportation, coordination, learning, and billing, each time he wants to serve a different 
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buyer.  I also make the standard assumption that different sellers are good at different tasks. In 
this context, Wernerfelt (2012a) compares three mechanisms: Employment, Sequential 
Contracting, and Markets. To facilitate comparison, I again assume that trade is ex post efficient 
in all three mechanisms. So the Employment and Sequential Contracting mechanisms are exactly 
the same as in Wernerfelt (1997) discussed above. The performance of Employment is gains 
from trade every period minus the one-time costs of negotiating the employment contract, and 
the performance of Sequential Contracting is gains from trade minus bargaining costs every 
period. The newly introduced mechanism, the Market, is different because sellers can specialize 
in the services at which they are most efficient. For example, instead of being superintendents 
they can be plumbers, carpenters, or electricians. So while gains from trade are higher, the 
downside is that sellers have to incur specific set-up costs each time they change to serve a new 
buyer.3 I show that there exist three regions in the parameter space in which each of these three 
mechanisms weakly dominates all others in a very large class. The relative performance depends 
on the frequency with which change is needed, the gains from specialization, the specific set-up 
costs, and bargaining costs. These are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
                                                          
3It is worth noting that this is not an argument about hold-up. What matters is the cost of the specific investment, not 
the extent to which it is made.  
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Figure 2 
Most Efficient Mechanisms 2 
Specific set-up costs                                                      
                       Sequential Contracting 
                                    
                    
                                                                                        
                                                                                          Employment 
                               Market                                                               
                                                                                                                             
 Importance of frequent adaptation    
In Figure 2, Markets are good when specific set-up costs are low, Sequential Contracting is again 
good when needs change infrequently, and Employment is good when the cost advantages of 
specialists are small and needs change fast.  
Figure 3 highlights another parameter, the gains from specialization. It shows that the Market is 
good when specialists are much more efficient than employees doing many different jobs.  
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Figure 3 
Most Efficient Mechanisms 3 
Gains from specialization                                                                                                        
                             Market 
                                                              
                                                                                                          
                                                                                         Employment 
                Sequential Contracting                                                              
                                                                            
                                                                                                          
 Importance of frequent adaptation 
 
The central empirical prediction of the theory; that more frequent changes make 
Employment more attractive, is tested in Novak and Wernerfelt (2012). We use data from the 
automobile industry. While a car is made up of thousands of parts, the industry divides them into 
36 “systems” (body in white”, interior, etc.).  These systems are interdependent to differing 
degrees and our hypothesis is that pairs of systems needing more frequent mutual adaptation are 
more likely to be designed and produced by a single firm. Interviews with a number of 
executives and experts in the global automobile market helped us produce a 36x36 matrix of 
these interdependencies. It turns out to be very hard to find the optimal structure of production 
(the number of possible solutions is on the order of the number of seconds since the big bang). 
However, the data suggests that the automotive industry does a very good job: pairs of systems 
needing more frequent mutual adjustment are much more likely to be housed in the same firm. 
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4. JUDGING THE THEORY AGAINST STYLIZED FACTS 
Asset Ownership 
Perhaps the central stylized fact to be faced by any theory of the firm is that the boss, the 
person being obeyed by the employee, generally owns the productive assets used by the latter. 
As its name suggests, the property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 
1990) has taken this stylized fact particularly seriously and in fact starts by analyzing who should 
own the assets and ends by defining that person as the boss. (So you are my boss if and only if I 
work with your assets.) While this represents a major advance over previous theories that more 
or less ignored the issue, there are cases in which employees own some assets – i. e. many 
craftsmen own their own tools. There are also cases in which employees appear to work with no 
assets at all. This then suggests that it is necessary to use two different theories to explain asset 
ownership and employment; although these theories still should be able to explain that the boss 
does own the assets in the vast majority of cases. 
Since the theory of the firm described in the previous Section does not depend on assets 
at all, I have many degrees of freedom in pairing it with a theory of asset ownership, as long as 
the latter uses the boss vs. employee roles as a significant input. One such theory is described in 
Wernerfelt (2002). The idea is simply, that since the boss decides how an asset should be used, 
she should bear the consequences of these decisions. For example, if the boss asks that a machine 
be used on a task that puts a lot of wear and tear on it, it is normally desirable that she pays the 
resulting externality in the form of depreciation costs. An important exception is one in which 
actions of the asset user (the employee) are a more important determinant of depreciation. (“Is a 
carpenter using a chisel as hammer?”) The theory depicts optimal ownership as striking a 
balance between the boss’s incentives when deciding what the asset is used for, and the 
employee’s incentives when deciding how to use the asset. It thus allows for cases in which the 
employee owns assets as well as for cases in which no assets are used. 
We test and refine this theory in Simester and Wernerfelt (2005). Using questionnaire 
data on fifty carpenters and forty-one tools, we find that employee ownership is more likely 
when the tool is easily lost or stolen (events that are under the control of the operator) and less 
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likely when the boss’s task assignment affects depreciation. Consistent with the idea that 
individual incentives for responsible use gets diluted when several employees use the same asset, 
we also find that shared-use assets are more likely to be owned by the boss. In contrast, we find 
no effect of asset specific human capital investments (although we cannot rule out that these play 
a role in other industries).  
Low-powered Incentives 
While the boss’s ownership of assets is the strongest and most precisely measured 
stylized fact about the theory of the firm, another important stylized facts are that employees face 
weaker incentives than independent contractors (Williamson, 1985) This, and the extent to which 
it is consistent with my theory, are taken up in Wernerfelt (2004b). 
To look at the steepness of incentives, I consider a principal-agent model in which the 
seller can exert different levels of effort resulting in more or less output.  According to the 
theory, employees may be asked to perform a wide variety of tasks, each with a different 
relationship between effort and value. Since this introduces more noise in the effort-outcome 
relationship, it means, in the presence of risk-aversion, that the optimal contract for an 
unspecified task is less steep than that for a specified task. More precisely, I compare two 
contracting regimes in a principal-agent model. In the ex ante regime, meant to represent 
employment, the task is not known and parties have symmetric but noisy information about the 
effort-outcome relationship. Standard arguments then show that the optimal contract is less steep 
the larger the noise. In the ex interim regime, meant to represent sequential contracting, the task 
is known, and the parties have less noisy but asymmetric information about the effort-outcome 
relationship. This allows steeper incentives, but raises the possibility of inefficient bargaining 
breakdown. So the choice between employment and sequential contracting is portrayed as a 
tradeoff between low-powered incentives and bargaining costs. 
Communication within and between firms 
It is widely believed that there is more communication within than between firms (Bolton 
and Dewatripont, 1994; Simester and Knez, 2002). To contrast communication within and 
between firms, Wernerfelt (2008) considers a bilateral trading game in which the seller may 
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discover an improved, but possibly more costly, widget design. After the discovery phase, he 
offers one, and only one, design to the buyer.  So if the seller has discovered the new design, he 
has the choice between offering it or the “old” design. I will think of him offering the new design 
as communicating about its discovery. In contrast, to find the new design but offer the old will be 
thought of as not communicating. In the ex ante bargaining mechanism, meant to represent 
Employment, the parties agree on a price before the seller learns about the existence, and if so 
the cost, of an improved design. In the ex post bargaining mechanism, meant to represent 
Sequential Contracting, the parties bargain after the seller has learned about the new design and 
had a chance to inform the buyer about its existence. In either case I assume that bargaining 
consists of the buyer making a take-it-or-leave-it offer. While the seller’s costs for the two 
designs are his private information, it is possible for the buyer to make some inferences about 
these costs by inverting the seller’s communication strategy. The key point is now that a proposal 
to trade the improved design allows the buyer to make some inferences about the relative costs of 
the old and the improved designs. A proposal to trade the old design may also reflect relative 
costs, but could just be driven by the seller not having found the improved design. So while 
“communication” – proposing the improved design – may allow the seller to share in a larger 
total surplus, it also reveals more information and allows the buyer to make a, for her, better 
TIOLI offer. Communication thus diminishes a player’s bargaining power, and there is a less 
incentive to communicate under sequential contracting. This concern does not play a role in the 
employment relationship, where the wage has been settled on ex ante, making ex post bargaining 
power irrelevant. So consistent with stylized facts, we have less communication between and 
within the firm. 
Delegation of decision rights 
Since the role of bargaining costs in motivating submission to authority is central to my 
theory of the employment relationship, one could conjecture that it also plays a role in delegation 
of decision rights within the firm. I have investigated two further perspectives on this.  
In Wernerfelt (2007a), I consider cases in which the delegating party can renegotiate a 
decision before it is implemented. In the presence of bargaining costs, contingent claims 
contracts are more expensive the more contingencies are covered. One way to avoid bargaining 
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over decisions in a contingency is to explicitly or tacitly give one party the right to decide. This 
is particularly attractive if the other party is relatively indifferent between the available options 
(Simon, 1951), if preferences are similar, and if the delegating player has comparatively poor 
information about the decision. However, even if both parties care a lot about the decision, 
delegation is possible as long as the delegating party retains the right to renegotiate/protest the 
decision. In the limit, if renegotiation is as cheap and as effective as bargaining, the parties can 
delegate everything. The threat of renegotiation may then discipline the decision-maker just 
enough that actual renegotiation becomes unnecessary, meaning that the parties do not even have 
to negotiate about the contingencies that do materialize. One should not think of this limit as 
interesting in itself – after all, it describes a case in which there was no reason to write a contract 
in the first place. The point is rather that players will want to delegate many contingencies even 
far away from the limit. So in this model, contracts can be incomplete because the threat of 
renegotiation makes it safe to leave them as such. The direction of causality in this argument is, 
of course, the opposite of that in the Property Rights literature in which incompleteness makes 
renegotiation feasible.  
In (Wernerfelt, 2007b), I again use the machinery of protests and renegotiation to look at 
the case in which bargaining costs take the form of decision-making costs. As any manager will 
tell you, making good decisions is hard work. You need to collect information, think through 
scenarios, and dream up alternative ways of doing things. One advantage of delegation or ceding 
of decision rights is thus that the delegating player saves these costs. This makes it more 
attractive to give up decision rights and effectively agree to take orders.4 The model considers a 
case in which a group of individuals have to make a single joint decision, but differ in their 
preferences as well as in the amount of information they have. If participation is costly, it is ex 
ante efficient to delegate the decision to a small committee whose members all have good 
information and jointly have average preferences. If, as in Wernerfelt (2007a), 
renegotiation/protests are possible, delegation becomes even more attractive and the optimal 
committee size smaller.  
 
 
                                                          
4 While my theory of the employment relationship does not make use of (depend on) this effect, nor on decision-
making costs, it does make employee status more palatable. Plus, it is consistent with the stylized fact that managers 
make a large number of decisions per hour, or even per minute (Guest, 1956). 
16 
 
5. HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND THE RBV 
Even though they often do not want it that way, firms are different; and according to the 
RBV, these differences play a large role in determining their strategies and behaviors. While 
these facts are readily accepted by management scholars, economists have had a harder time with 
them. The issue is that it has been very difficult to understand why imitation does not eliminate 
all important differences. The present Section links my theory of the firm to heterogeneity and 
ultimately the RBV in two steps. The first shows how small differences might emerge even if 
firms are ex ante identical, and the second uses the theory to show how small differences 
endogenously can turn into large differences.  
In Wernerfelt (2004a) I look at a team in which wants to allocate a set of resources to 
those members for whom they are worth the most. Individual valuations are private information, 
but the members may communicate in “rounds”, meaning that each member can send one binary 
message to a center in each round. A code can be represented as a sequence of nested bisections 
of the set of possible valuations. For example, if the values 1, 2, 3, and 4 are possible, one code 
could have “High” meaning “3 or 4” and “High, Low” meaning “3”, while another code could 
have “high” meaning “2, 3, or 4”, and “High, Low” meaning “ 2 or 3”. Members choose their 
codes individually, but all measure performance by the expected number of rounds needed to 
perfectly allocate the resources. A code is “linear” if when x < y < z and it sends the same 
message for x and z, then it also sends that message for y. A set of codes are in equilibrium if no 
unilateral deviation gives the team higher payoff. The main results are that all equilibria are 
symmetric in the sense that all members use the same code, and that any linear code can be 
sustained in equilibrium as long as all members use it. Since linear codes differ in their 
efficiency, this means that I have multiple, more or less efficient equilibria. To the extent that 
equilibrium selection is random, this then suggests that ex ante identical teams can end up in 
different equilibria with very different efficiencies.5 
To explore the implications of manufacturer heterogeneity, Wernerfelt (2012b) 
generalizes the theory of the firm discussed in Section 3 by adding a richer model of buyers, who 
                                                          
5 Also Wernerfelt (2003) shows how small initial differences can grow to become very large. The essential idea is 
that firms will invest in areas where they have a comparative advantage. A small heterogeneity in a segment will 
lead to more investment by the leading firm and less by its competitors, resulting in ever larger differences. 
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here should be thought of as manufacturers. As in the original model, there are a lot of possible 
services, and each seller can perform one unit of one service per period. There are gains from 
specialization because each seller can perform one particular task at lower cost than all others. 
To keep things simple, I assume that Markets and Employment relationships are the only two 
trading mechanisms. 
The central difference between this and the original model is that buyers/manufacturers 
differ in how many services they need per period. In particular, some “big” manufacturers may 
almost certainly need one or more specific services in every period. This feature makes it 
possible to specialize as an employee. So laborers can be generalist Employees 
(superintendents), specialist Employees (plumbers working full time for big landlords) or 
specialists selling in Markets (independent plumbers). Specialist Employees are very efficient; 
they only perform the service they are best at and they do not have to pay specific set-up costs. 
Reflecting this, I find, under reasonable assumptions, that the most efficient sellers become 
specialist Employees, while the least efficient sellers become generalist Employees. (I also find 
that Markets are used for services with greater gains from specialization and less aggregate 
demand.) 
The most interesting effect, at least for the present purposes, appears if I assume that 
manufacturers can decide how many services they will need. In this case, manufacturers will 
prefer services that can be performed at lower cost, and the advantages of specialization will 
drive fractional needs out to the extent possible, such that manufacturers can hire specialist 
Employees. For example, starting from a position in which she needs a plumber 75% of the time, 
a manufacturer will expand her business to the point where the plumber can specialize.6  In other 
words, manufacturers will focus on what the already are good at in order to leverage that and 
become even more efficient. This idea, running and expanding the firm to leverage excess 
capacity of productive resources, is of course one of the central tenets of the RBV, and includes 
as a special case Penrose’s growth from excess capacity of managerial resources.  
 
                                                          
6 Or, similarly, the manufacturer will expand if she is close to the point at which a specialist plumber can be hired. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
The theory sketched in this paper offers an answer to fundamental questions in the study 
of business and can at the same time serve as a micro-foundation for the RBV. We normally 
think of more complex resources than the plumbers used in the above toy-example, but the same 
argument goes through in more realistic cases involving teams of employees with 
complementary skills. In fact, the theory will tend to predict that firms grow very large. Once a 
manufacturer has expanded enough to utilize all her capacity of one type of specialist, she may 
find herself tempted to expand further to utilize a specialist in another area, etc, etc. If we make 
the realistic assumption that tasks are complements, this growth process can snowball very fast. 
The theory is still incomplete when it comes to the scope of the firm. As noted above, it is 
not hard to use it to justify expansion and diversification. The problem is that the only break on 
expansion is that more employment contracts have to be negotiated. (In the extreme case in 
which expansion happens by merger, only one more employment contract is needed.) Although 
this is reasonable when the firms are small, it does not make sense for two large firms.7  
There are several possible ways to address this issue. The simplest and most reasonable 
might be to start with the models of delegation discussed in Section 4, while another may be to 
look into the loss of strategic focus as the firm becomes larger and more diverse. I have, 
however, not yet looked into any of these possibilities. 
  
                                                          
7 Since the same weakness plagues other formalized theories of the firm as well (in the property rights theory, the 
analog cost is that one more player has bad incentives), the problem is that very simple models miss some forces that 
only kick in once firms are sufficiently large. 
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